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IN RE MOORE
In Re Moore: The Sound and the Fury and the Scalpel
The North Carolina General Statutes § 35-36 through § 35-50 (1976)
provide for the sterilization of the mentally ill and the mentally retarded,
institutionalized or not institutionalized. The statutes provide that the peti-
tioner may be a director of a state institution, director of social services, or
the next of kin or legal guardian of the individual who acts through the
institution director or director of social services. Such individuals petition
the appropriate district court for a sterilization operation order. Consent may
be given by the person upon whom the operation is to be performed, her or
his next of kin, legal guardian, or a guardian ad litem appointed by the
district court. Notice of the hearing or the petition is served upon the patient
and the guardian or next of kin. Upon request, a hearing is granted and there
is a right to appeal to the superior court. The person subject to the statute has
a right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings and counsel will be
appointed in cases of indigency.
North Carolina enacted its first sterilization laws in 1919.' After a suc-
cessful constitutional attack on procedural due process grounds, in Brewer
v. Valk,2 the statutes were rewritten to satisfy procedural requirements.
By comparison with the rest of the country, North Carolina sterilizes a
great number of individuals. In 1963, with a population of not quite five
million, North Carolina sterilized 240 persons, while California, with a
population of eighteen million, performed 17 sterilizations. 3 Of the reported
sterilizations in 1963, 51% of them took place in North Carolina. 4 These
statistics indicate that North Carolina utilizes its sterilization laws relatively
frequently. A recent North Carolina case, In re Moore,5 re-examined these
statutes.
On May 21, 1975 the director of the Forsyth County Department of Social
Services petitioned the court for an order authorizing the sterilization of
Joseph Lee Moore, a minor, pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes §
35-36 through § 35-50 (1976). Accompanying the petition was the written
consent of Joseph Lee Moore and his mother, and a psychological report
which indicated that Joseph was presently functioning at a moderately
retarded level of intelligence; with an intelligence quotient of under 40 and a
1. Statutory Changes in North Carolina, 7 N.C.L. REV. 392 (1929); Statutory Changes in
North Carolina, I I N.C.L. REV. 253 (1933).
2. 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
3. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 600
(1966).
4. Id. at 601.
5. 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
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test-age score of 8. The petitioner found Joseph to be a proper subject for
sterilization based on the criteria given in the above statutes, i.e., he
believed that unless sterilized, Joseph would likely procreate a child or
children who would probably have serious physical, mental or nervous
diseases or deficiencies. As required by statute, a statement by an examining
physician to the effect that there was no contra-indication that Joseph could
withstand the surgery accompanied the petition.
The respondent, Joseph Moore, through his guardian ad litem and attor-
ney, filed a motion to quash the petition alleging that North Carolina
General Statutes § 35-36 et. seq., were unconstitutional. Forsyth Superior
Court allowed the motion, finding said statutes unconstitutional. The state
gave notice of appeal to the court of appeals and the respondent petitioned
the North Carolina Supreme Court to hear the matter prior to determination
by the court of appeals. The petition was allowed on August 27, 1975.
On appeal, the respondent attacked the statutes on the grounds that they
were violative of the substantive and procedural aspects of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the
law of the land clause of article I, section 19, of the North Carolina
Constitution. Further, respondent alleged that the statutes denied him equal
protection of the law, were unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary, and
provide for cruel and unusual punishment.
The court, in an opinion by Justice Moore, upheld the statutes as constitu-
tional. Citing Buck v. Bell,6 the court stated that the state had a valid and
compelling interest in the future life of the unborn child and in the welfare of
the parent-sufficient to justify the state's right to sterilize retarded or
insane persons. 7 Using the same reasoning as a recent Nebraska case 8 on the
same issue, the court stated that the people of North Carolina have the right
to prevent the procreation of children who will become a burden on the
state. 9 For these reasons, the statutes were found non-violative of the
substantive aspect of the due process clause.
Procedural due process requirements were found to be satisfied because
the statutes provide for notice, a hearing on request, the right to appeal,
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, appointed counsel in cases of
indigency, a court appointed guardian ad litem if there is no next of kin or
legal guardian, and a right of cross-examination if a hearing is requested.
The respondent asserted that the state should provide, in cases of indigency,
the necessary funds to obtain a medical expert on his behalf. The court
stated that such a procedural safeguard was adequately covered by North
Carolina General Statute § 7A-454 (1976) which allows the court, in its
6. 274 U.S. 200 (1926).
7. 221 S.E.2d 307, 313.
8. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
9. 221 S.E.2d 307, 311-313.
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IN RE MOORE
discretion, to approve a fee for an expert witness to testify for an indigent
person.'° The allegation of cruel and unusual punishment was summarily
dismissed by the court as inapplicable in a civil proceeding."1
The legislative classification in question was upheld as reasonably related
to the purposes of the statute and therefore non-violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The court found that the object of the
statutes is to prevent the procreation of children by a mentally ill or retarded
person "who because of physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency
which is not likely to materially improve, would probably be unable to care
for a child . . . or who would likely, unless sterilized, procreate a child
. . . who probably would have serious physical, mental, or nervous dis-
eases or deficiencies. "12
In support of his contention that the statutes were vague and arbitrary,
respondent submitted that the statutes provide no adequate judicial standard
to aid the court in its decision whether to authorize a sterilization. Without
such a standard, the respondent alleged, the statute is unconstitutionally
vague and arbitrary.' 3 The court found to the contrary, holding that the
statute is presumed valid, that the term "mentally defective" is capable of
being understood with the help of experts in the field, and therefore, the
statutes were not unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary.' 4
The principles of eugenics, a means of race improvement via hereditary
quality manipulation, are ancient in origin. Since at least the time of Plato's
Republic, philosphers and scientists have advocated various methods of
selective breeding designed to improve the human race. 15 In the United
States eugenics manifested itself in the form of compulsory sterilization
laws. It was believed that mental retardation, mental illness, epilepsy,
criminal tendencies and sexual perversions were hereditary and that sterili-
zation would rid society of "inferior" persons. The sterilization movement
reached its peak in the early 1900's, influenced by the theories of Sir Francis
Galton and a rediscovery of Mendel's law of heredity and its application to
human beings. The famous studies of the Kallikaks and the Jukes by H. H.
Goddard and R. L. Dugdale, respectively, allegedly "proving" the heredi-
tary qualities of mental retardation, disease, crime, immortality, and
pauperism, stirred public interest and increased the demand for gene plan-
ning. With the development of simple surgical procedures that could accom-
plish sexual sterilization, without attendant hormonial aberrations, theory
could be put into practice. The first compulsory sterilization law was passed
by Indiana in 1907.16 By 1942, thirty-two states had passed similar laws, but
10. Id. at 310, 311.
11. Id. at 315, 316.
12. Id. at 312-314.
13. Id. at 314.
14. Id. at 315.
15. Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of
Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 190 (1971).
16. Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 960 (1973).
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to date only twenty-nine states have retained eugenic sterilization laws.' 7 By
the late 1920's, a combination of public sentiment against eugenic meas-
ures, and scientific demonstrations of the fallaciousness of the basis of such
measures, severely weakened the eugenic movement in the United States.
People became even more hostile toward eugenic planning when it was
learned that hundreds of thousands were sterilized and millions murdered
during the Nazi regime in order to "improve and purify the race". 18
Although the general public grew to dislike the theory of eugenics, that
theory had been the basis for the enacted sterilization statutes and, for the
most part, these statutes remained a part of the public laws. Court decisions
concerning the constitutionality of eugenics sterilization have continued to
be based on the premise that the underlying eugenics theory is sound.
Because of this supposed soundness these statutes have been held non-
violative of the substantive aspects of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The case most often
cited for support, and cited in Moore, is Buck v. Bell.19 In Buck the United
States Supreme Court upheld, for the first time, the right of a state to
sterilize retarded or insane persons. The Virginia sterilization statute in
question provided for the sterilization of a feeble-minded inmate of a state
institution where it was found that she or he would be a probable potential
parent of a child with the same or similar affliction, that she may be
sterilized without harming her general health, and her and society's welfare
would be promoted by her sterilization. In the majority opinion, Justice
Holmes stated that at various times the best citizens are called upon for their
lives and therefore it would be strange if those who sap the strength of the
state could not be called on for the lesser sacrifice of sterilization. Further,
he wrote that it would be better to prevent the "unfit" from continuing their
kind rather than to let them starve because of their mental deficiency or be
executed for a crime. 2
0
The court used the rational relationship test, even though a fundamental
right was involved. This case is still cited by courts for support of the state's
right to sterilize the mentally ill and the mentally retarded; 21 even though the
standard currently used in cases involving fundamental rights is much more
stringent.
An underlying issue not disputed by the Court in Buck or questioned by
the North Carolina court in Moore, is the validity of the eugenic basis of the
17. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW, at 97 (1976).
18. Vukowich, supra note 15, at 190.
19. 274 U.S. 200 (1926).
20. Id. at 207.
21. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d
171, 174 (1968); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123, 128 (1925).
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statutes in question. Today, facile conclusions regarding genetic causes of a
particular condition are seldom made. Perhaps the largest problem in deter-
mining the cause of a specific disorder, which could result in compulsory
sterilization, is that it is often difficult or impossible to distinguish genetic
causes from environmental causes. 22 Secondly, 80-90% of known retardates
are born to normal parents.23 More than 250 causes of mental deficiency
have been identified to date and yet, in approximately 75% of the cases of
retardation, no specific cause can be ascertained. 24 Justice Holmes also
stated that society was being "swamped with incompetence", 25 referring to
the myth of prolific reproduction attributed to mentally retarded individuals.
However statistics indicate that the insane and the mentally retarded have
significantly low rates of reproduction. 26 Many retarded persons are physic-
ally unable to bear or beget children. 27 Among the major premises of
eugenics is that the total number of mental defectives in society will be
reduced. Yet current genetic and scientific knowledge indicate that the total
number of disordered persons in society will not be substantially reduced by
such methods. 28
There is agreement among modern geneticists that hereditary transmis-
sion of mental defects is much less significant than previously believed.29
The diversity of opinion, and the blatant contradiction of data on the validity
and effectiveness of eugenic sterilization, raise serious question as to
whether eugenics sterilization is a reasonable exercise of the state's police
power. If the purpose of the statute is proper, i.e. protection of the health,
safety, and welfare of the genes of society, does eugenic sterilization bear a
real and substantial relation to the accomplishment of that purpose? In light
of such an abundance of contradictory scientific information an affirmative
reply appears doubtful.
In order to satisfy substantive due process requirements the state must use
the least onerous means to accomplish their objectives. There are indeed less
burdensome means which could be used; for example, temporary contracep-
tion, segregation during reproductive periods, and eugenic abortion upon
evidence of a damaged fetus. 30
22. Environmental causes include trauma (prenatal, natal and postnatal), disease, metabol-
ic disturbances (phenylketonuria, galactosemia, etc.), toxic agencies, brain lesion, etc. 21 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 59 (1968).
23. Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution, 62 CAL. L. REV. 917,
926 (1974).
24. B.J. ENNIS & P.R. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, at 20
(1973).
25. 274 U.S. at 207.
26. 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 48 (1968).
27. Murdock, supra note 23, at 934.
28. 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 55 (1968).
29. Id. at § 64.
30. Murdock, supra note 23, at 927.
5
Henry: In Re Moore: The Sound and the Fury and the Scalpel
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977
312 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
The second major premise of the sterilization statutes is the assumption
that mentally retarded individuals will be inadequate parents. These popular
prejudices and stereotypes that automatically attach to the group portray
mental retardates as less than human. 3' However, there is current scientific
knowledge which indicates that the mentally retarded are not necessarily
poor parents and that they do not necessarily provide poor environments.32
Almost 90% of persons classified as retarded are in fact only mildly
retarded, which includes persons who, through special education, can usual-
ly be brought to self-sufficiency. 33 Leo Kanner, an eminent child psychia-
trist, in his book, A MINIATURE TEXTBOOK OF FEEBLEMINDEDNESS, said:
In my twenty years of psychiatric work with thousands of children
and their parents, I have seen percentually at least as many "intelli-
gent" adults unfit to rear their offspring as I have seen "feeblemind-
ed" adults. I have . . . and many others have . . . come to the
conclusion that to a large extent independent of the I. Q., fitness for
parenthood is determined by emotional involvements and relation-
ships.34
The difficulty arises in predicting who will be an unfit parent before they
become parents. The North Carolina statutes concerning neglected or
abused children base the determination of parental unfitness on the psycho-
logical and physical well being of the child already in existence.35 The
object of the North Carolina sterilization statute, as stated in Moore, allows
for compulsory sterilization to prevent those who would probably be unable
to care for a child or children. 36 However, no one would dispute the fact that
not all unfit parents are mentally retarded. If the purpose of the statute is to
eliminate unfit, parents, it is under-inclusive if it is only aimed at those that
have been designated "mentally defective". At the same time, the statute is
unnecessarily broad because not all mental retardates are unfit parents. The
state's interest may not be achieved by "means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 37
A second prong of the "unfitness" premise is concerned with generations
of "welfare families". Because of the immense competition over tax dol-
lars, eugenic theories for compulsory sterilization have often given way to
fiscal and psychological ones. 38 These bases have been attacked in two
recent cases, Cook v. Oregon39 and Cox v. Stanton.40
31. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 17, at -.
32. 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 55 (1968).
33. Murdock, supra note 23, at 927.
34. L. KANNER, A MINIATURE TEXTBOOK OF FEEBLEMINDEDNESS, at 4, 5 (1949) cited in
Ferster, supra note 3, at 623.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-118, 110-119 (1976).
36. 221 S.E.2d at 311, 312.
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964).
38. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 17, at 96.
39. 495 P.2d 768 (Or. App. 1972).
40. 381 F.Supp. 349 (1974).
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In Cook v. Oregon, the plaintiff alleged that the Oregon statute which
allowed for compulsory sterilization of individuals whose children will
become neglected or dependent as a result of their parents inability by
reason of mental illness or mental retardation to provide adequate care,
denied equal protection of the laws to indigent parents.4 ' The Oregon Court
of Appeals upheld the statute, and stated that the state was concerned that
the proper environment be provided for the child, not with the financial
status of the parents, and therefore found no denial of equal protection of the
laws to indigent persons.42
In Cox, the North Carolina plaintiff alleged that she was pressured into
consenting to a sterilization by her welfare worker-under threat that other-
wise she and her family would be removed from the welfare rolls. Secondly,
although she consented to a tubal ligation (a temporary sterilization proce-
dure) a permanent bilateral salpingectomy was performed instead.43 The
court never decided these issues, however, because the applicable statute of
limitations barred the cause of action and, further, since she had been
sterilized, she had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
sterilization statutes. 4
The possible abuses of such statutes, using an anti-welfare rationale, are
apparent and is emphasized by the two cases cited above. A state interest in
saving money, rather than spending it on those who would become wards of
the state, has never justified interference with a fundamental right.
In Moore, the respondent alleged that all of his procedural due process
safeguards had not been satisfied because the statute did not give him the
right to an expert witness to testify on his behalf, paid for by the state. The
court may, in its discretion, provide for an expert witness for indigent
persons. In Moore, this was found to be sufficient to meet procedural due
process requirements. 45 According to North Carolina General Statute § 35-
40 (1976) the petition for sterilization must contain allegations of the results
of psychologic and psychiatric tests supporting the assertion that the indi-
vidual is subject to the statutes. The potential conflict arises because of the
possibility of diverse results when administering psychological tests and,
secondly, because the tests may be conducted by the same institution or
petitioner who seeks the sterilization order.
The usual tests given to children and teenagers is the Stanford-Binet and
the usual test given to adults is the Wechsler-Bellevue. 46 Unfortunately, I.
Q. test scores are influenced by many factors; such as motivation, test-
taking attitudes, verbal facility, examiner's incompetence, spasticity, deaf-
41. 495 P.2d at 770.
42. Id. at 771.
43. 381 F.Supp. at 351.
44. Id. at 355.
45. 221 S.E.2d at 310.
46. 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 62 (1968).
7
Henry: In Re Moore: The Sound and the Fury and the Scalpel
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977
314 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
ness, and blindness, socio-cultural variables, anxiety, and other factors
largely unrelated to intelligence. Testing errors are not uncommon. Carrie
Buck, the "imbecile" sought to be sterilized in Buck, was found to be a
moron, a higher intellectual classification than an imbecile. Her mother was
also found to be a moron, not an imbecile, and Carrie's daughter (the
alleged "third generation imbecile"), 48 originally diagnosed and classified
as an imbecile by a Red Cross Nurse when the child was only a month old,
was later considered to be "very bright" .49 To further highlight the frequen-
cy of inaccurate diagnosis, the authors of MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
wrote that they:
are familiar with the case of a child whose admission to the public
school system was refused because of his alleged imbecility as
demonstrated by psychometric tests. The boy's parents, knowing
that he was not feebleminded, sent him to a private school, where he
soon demonstrated that he was of superior intelligency. At the usual
age he entered a university, from which he graduated with honors.5"
Another example of the problem of inaccurate diagnosis was recently found
in Dennison v. State,5 1 where a claimant successfully brought an action for
false imprisonment; for his unlawful confinement in the state's correctional
hospital after being erroneously classified as a "low grade moron". Subse-
quent to the claimant's discharge, independent tests administered by three
highly qualified psychologists "conclusively established that he possessed
average intelligence and that he could not possibly have been a low grade
moron at some other point in his life." 52
Another danger of relying on test results that conclude "mental deficien-
cy" is that such a label does not always survive into adulthood. A widely
accepted conclusion regarding the incidence of mental retardation is that at
some time in their life 3% of the United States population (more than six
million Americans) will function in the mentally retarded range. However,
probably no more than 1% of the population are technically mentally
retarded at any given time. The primary period of identification is between
the ages of six and twelve, and about two-thirds of those diagnosed as
mentally deficient lose this label during late adolescence or early adult-
hood.53 Interestingly, 30% of those sterilized in North Carolina between
1962 and 1964 were children between the ages of 10 and 19. 54
47. Roos, Mentally Retarded Citizens: Challengefor the 1970's, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1059,
1070 (1972).
48. 274 U.S. at 207.
49. 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 63 (1968).
50. NOYES & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, at 282 (1963) cited in 21 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization § 63 (1968).
51. 49 Misc.2d 933, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1966), rvsd on other grounds in 280 N.Y.S.2d 31
(1967).
52. Id. at 923.
53. B.J. ENNIS & P.R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 20.
54. Ferster, supra note 3, at 622.
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The above difficulties encountered in testing indicate the necessity for
thorough evaluation of the subject of the sterilization petition. If the subject
has his own expert witness, contradictory data, abuses, errors and mitigating
circumstances would be brought to the attention of the court. This procedur-
al safeguard does not'seem inappropriate when a fundamental right is
involved.
CONCLUSION
The courts, including the North Carolina Courts, continue to use Buck v.
Bell as support for the reasonableness of the state's police power to sterilize
the mentally ill and the mentally retarded, regardless of the difference in the
standard use by Buck Court and the one currently used by the United States
Supreme Court. The courts have continued to uphold laws based on data
which has consistently been challenged and contradicted by.verifiable scien-
tific information. With such a shaky foundation, the reasonableness of this
exercise of the police power is indeed difficult to justify.
Should mentally retarded individuals be protected less than others be-
cause of their intellect? Or should it be to the contrary, the retarded seen as
an insular minority-a suspect classification, to be protected from hasty
generalizations and treatment as if they were less than human? They should
at least be afforded the protection given to others. Legislation affecting their
fundamental rights should be subject to the strictest scrutiny and its bases
and purposes critically examined to determine if it is based on scientifically
verifiable data instead of human prejudice and fear.
NORA BIRZON HENRY
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